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INTRODUCTION
Should prosecutors use their position and power to take criminal justice reform into their
own hands?1 Prosecutors have been thrust into a new space where they are forced to make blanket
decisions about certain atypical phases in the criminal justice system. These phases are atypical
in that guilt is not the factual issue before the court, and although bargaining may be present, the
process is not wholly centered around adjudication. Decisions relating to charging, bail, and
expungement fall into this category of atypical phases. Traditionally, all phases of the prosecutor’s
role have been adversarial.2 Now, the 21st century prosecutor is being put in a role where default
adversarial posture may not make sense. So called progressive prosecuting has created uncharted
territory for prosecutors to take a more cooperative approach in these atypical phases of the
criminal justice system.3 Today’s prosecutors may even be in an environment of office-wide
mandates to deny charging of certain crimes, promote bail reform, and represent class actions of
expungement. Office culture that pursues these goals was unheard of in the time of the traditional
prosecutor but is increasingly becoming normative throughout this reform movement.
Put simply, there is a new era of prosecutors in the 21 st century. These 21st century
prosecutors have brought about a rise in prosecutors as primary actors for positive change in the
face of systemic issues in the criminal justice system. There are several reasons why prosecutorial
reform matters for the overall reform of the criminal justice system. Prosecutors are in fact the
frontrunners in many phases of the system, including being the prime players in determining who
to charge, who to release, and who has their record expunged, which have become broad points of
See, e.g., Emily Bazelon and Miriam Krinsky, There’s a Wave of New Prosecutors. And They Mean Justice, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/11/opinion/how-local-prosecutors-can-reform-their-justicesystems.html.
2 See generally, Earl J. Shilbert, The Role of the Prosecutor in the Process of Criminal Justice, 63 A.B.A. J. 1717,
1717-20 (1977) (detailing the role of traditional role of a prosecutor and proposing expansion).
3 See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, The Limits of Prosecutorial Power, THE M ARSHALL PROJECT , May 2, 2017,
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/05/02/the-limits-of-prosecutorial-power.
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focus in decriminalization. The issue of prosecutorial discretion during these phases that are not
per se adversarial as pure adjudication of guilt exists within a larger backdrop of trends in criminal
justice relating to an expansion of the system generally, and specifically incarceration. Our nation
is confronted with this issue that other constitutional actors have yet to overcome. The United
States of America traditionally continued to increase incarceration rates even as we had the largest
percentages of imprisoned people in the world.4 With continual climb in convictions comes an
increase in the disparate ratio of minorities in the system, a prevalent issue in the criminal justice
system that is already displayed as a drastic misrepresentation of population statistics.5 Beyond
the mere numbers of persons locked up in United States prisons or involved in the criminal justice
system, the most shocking statistic is this disparate impact upon people of color.6 For example, in
Wisconsin where African Americans represent six percent of the population, they make up thirtyseven percent of the state prison population. 7
The new approach to prosecution is arguably quasi-legislative and may be viewed to
undermine certain priorities of other constitutional actors.

Forces both outside and inside

prosecutor offices, including judges, elected officials, the police, and other prosecutors, are
resisting this new era of prosecution.8 However, this prosecutorial approach can also bring
prosecutors to the forefront of positive change in the criminal justice system to combat the plague
of high incarceration rates. There is little governing law for the prosecutorial role in the atypical

4

See generally, Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Yes, U.S. Locks People Up at a Higher Rate Than Any Other Country,
WASHINGTON POST, July 7, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/07/yes-u-s-lockspeople-up-at-a-higher-rate-than-any-other-country/.
5 See generally, M ICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM C ROW: M ASS I NCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2012) (detailing the disparate impact of the criminal justice system on people of color).
6 Id.
7 See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, The Milwaukee Experiment: What Can One Prosecutor Do About the Mass Incarceration
of African Americans, N.Y. TIMES, May. 4, 2015, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/05/11/the-milwaukeeexperiment.
8 Barkow, Rachel E., Can Prosecutors Help To End Mass Incarceration? M ICHIGAN L. R EV., Forthcoming,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3758006.
Thomas

3

phases of charging, bail, and expungement, but other criminal justice actors and academics have
made separation of powers arguments against sweeping progressive reform. Still, these arguments
beg the question of whether prosecutors becoming de facto policy makers is justified, and if so, on
what grounds. Some argue the answer to this question rests on ethical considerations, such as the
goal of decriminalization and reduction of disparate impact on minorities, which should override
any contradictory approach by the legislature.
The ultimate question of whether prosecutors should use their position and power to take
criminal justice reform into their own hands includes a follow up question to determine what legal
and ethical principles should provide guidance. There are different theories, including guidance
from the Supreme Court and the separation of powers doctrine, to the Model Rules, to line
prosecution norms and internal office culture. Whether the criminal justice system should value
uniformity and clarity or diversity and creativity, and whether the answer should be in a
neighborhood-by-neighborhood, office-by-office, state-by-state or nationwide form, has been
debated by many legal scholars and criminal justice actors.
This paper contributes to the above-mentioned discussions. First, this paper identifies both
the power prosecutors have in exercising discretion in the atypical phases of charging, bail, and
expungement and the need and opportunity for positive change at such phases. Second, this paper
explores how this new era of progressive prosecuting has restructured the prosecutorial role in
these atypical phases. Third, this paper compiles potential theories of guidance for prosecutors
based in legal and ethical principles by canvasing the possible paths for guiding the new era
prosecutor.
To accomplish the above three goals, this paper is broken into four parts. Part I is a current
event depiction of progressive prosecution through news articles on the tactics of certain local
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prosecutor’s offices. The 21st century prosecutor examples are juxtaposed against the traditional
role prosecutors were encouraged to take prior to the reform movement. These illustrations depict
the significance of prosecutorial discretion for pursuing criminal justice reform. Next, Part II
analyzes the specific atypical phases of charging, bail, and expungement. First, it identifies the
traditional role of prosecutors at each phase. Second, it explores various reform movements of
each stage and the impact each reform may have on the criminal justice issues of mass
incarceration and disparate impact. Part III then moves the discussion to different theories of
guidance for how prosecutors should navigate this new space. This discussion includes arguments
against prosecutor’s acting in a quasi-legislative role based on separation of powers principles and
limited governing law for these phases. But it argues that there are many potential legal and ethical
principles that could provide guidance for the 21 st century prosecutor. Potentially, such nuances
in ethical arguments may lean towards progressive prosecutors using their power for positive
change, even in the face of backlash from other constitutional actors. Part III is divided into two
subparts – law and ethics, analyzing seminal cases in the legal realm, the model rules, and office
culture and norms for an ethical backdrop. Part IV concludes this paper with a canvasing of how
prosecution, and even progressive prosecution with similar goals, can look different based on
which theory an office may rely. Theories may work differently for different phases and in
different areas of the country, thus, the purpose of this paper is not necessarily to select a solution
to over-criminalization through prioritizing theories for what the prosecutorial role should look
like. Instead, the purpose of this paper is to provide a descriptive contribution of potential
prosecutorial roles in the atypical phases of charging, bail, and expungement and the impact
different approaches to the prosecutorial role at these phases may have on criminal justice reform.
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I.

RISE OF THE NEW PROSECUTOR AS A PRIMARY ACTOR FOR CHANGE
This part addresses the phenomenon known as “the rise of the new prosecutors” within the

broader backdrop of movements towards criminal justice reform. Namely, how progressive
prosecuting can reduce mass incarceration and disparate impact on minorities. It begins with the
idea of what the traditional prosecutorial role consists of and how such a tough on crime traditional
mold may have played the largest role in over-criminalization. It next continues to discuss the rise
of progressive prosecuting and goes on to juxtapose a new movement among progressive
prosecutors against the traditionally adversarial model. Further, it discusses how prosecutors have
the power to use their position for positive change through this new movement.
A. Traditional Prosecutors: Adversarial and Adjudicative
Prosecutors have traditionally played an adversarial role with a narrow sphere of
responsibility in the criminal justice system.9 This role was typically composed of receiving cases,
filing charges, adjudicating a plea or trial and moving on to the next case. 10 Until the 21st century,
this idea of the prosecutorial role perpetuated systemic issues in the criminal justice system due to
culture and resource limitations.11 Resource scarcity today means a rationing of criminal justice
away from over-criminalization and over-incarceration, but before the push for reform, it did not
necessarily generate accordance with the public’s sense of justice. 12

It largely meant that

prosecutor offices lacked the capacity or the support to address crime problems holistically. 13
Instead prosecutors were more a part of a binary system, where the aim was to be adversarial and
representation of the State may not have necessarily reflected representation of the people. In

9

Shilbert, supra note 2.
Id.
11 Id.
12 Bibas, Stephanos, The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion, FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP AT PENN LAW, 1427, (2010),
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1427 .
13 Shilbert, supra note 2 at 1717.
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adversarial postures, the legal profession often painted prosecutors as conservative, severe, and
unforgiving.14 The overall aim of this hard-nosed traditional prosecutor boiled down to one
concept: enforcing the law.15
Execution of the law used to mean being tough on crime, which in turn, meant locking
people up to protect the public.16 Legal scholars have argued that such tough on crime prosecution
bears a majority of the responsibility for the mass incarceration issue of the United States. 17 This
argument blames mass incarceration on prosecutorial dominance,18 and that previous deference to
prosecutorial discretion meant severe punishment and severe consequences.19 But the rationale
behind the power of a traditional prosecutor can be used to support the rationale behind the power
of a progressive one. It is a two headed coin. If prosecutors make decisions to charge, request bail
conditions, essentially keep a person in jail or with a criminal record hanging over them,
prosecutors can also decide not to; that is exactly what progressive prosecutors are doing.
Progressive prosecutors are breaking the traditional law-and-order mold of their role in the
criminal justice system.
B. The Power of the Local Prosecutor in a New Wave of Reform
Analyzing the criminal justice system involves analyzing power and analyzing the
consequences of prosecutors’ decisions shows the brunt of that power.20 Some scholars argue

See, e.g., Jennifer Gonnerman, Larry Krasner’s Campaign to End Mass Incarceration, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2018,
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/29/larry-krasners-campaign-to-end-mass-incarceration.
15 See generally JOHN L. WORRALL & M. ELAINE NUGENT -B ORAKOVE , THE C HANGING R OLE OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR at 4 (2017).
16 See, e.g., David Lat, How Tough-on-Crime Prosecutors Contribute to Mass Incarceration, N.Y. TIMES, April 8,
2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/08/books/review/emily -bazelon-charged.html.
17 Id.
18 See generally JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED I N: THE TRUE C AUSES OF M ASS I NCARCERATION AND H OW TO ACHIEVE REAL
REFORM (2017) (assessing prosecutor’s role in exploding incarceration rates).
19 Barkow, supra note 8.
20 See, e.g., David Lat, How Tough-on-Crime Prosecutors Contribute to Mass Incarceration, N.Y. TIMES, April 8,
2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/08/books/review/emily -bazelon-charged.html.
14
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whether prosecutors should have the power to impact change on the criminal justice system, but
almost all scholars opine that prosecutors wield this power.

Many legal scholars consider

prosecutors as the most powerful actor in the criminal justice system.21 Local district attorneys
straddle a line between the judiciary and the legislature, in between the court system and the world
of politics.22 Despite the traditional method of prosecution prior to the 21 st century, it is plausible
that prosecutors can use their role to respond to crime problems and overall systemic issues in
criminal justice.23 Beyond executing the law, prosecutors hold the potential to influence law
enforcement through various phases in administering justice.24 Prosecutors have evolved into
powerful political figures, often in response to democratic input from their communities
encouraging progressive movements.25 Prosecutors can use such power to pursue positive change
in the criminal justice system.
Local prosecutors are the most highly involved constitutional actors in the criminal justice
system at the ground level and have enough discretion to create change.26 Local prosecutors handle
ninety-five percent of the criminal cases brought in the United States, 27 fourteen times as many
felonies and several hundred times as many misdemeanors as federal prosecutors. 28 Thus, local
prosecutors are positioned to handle reform through their broad discretion on whether and how to
prosecute.29 Prosecutors can generate decriminalization and dismantle mass incarceration through
reforms starting at the outset of a case through declining to charge certain low-level offenses30 and

21

See, e.g., Bellin, The Limits of Prosecutorial Power,
See generally, WORRALL & NUGENT-BORAKOVE , THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR at 4.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 See, e.g., Bazelon and Krinsky, There’s a Wave of New Prosecutors. And They Mean Justice.
27 Id.
28 See generally WILLIAM J. STUNTZ , THE C OLLAPSE OF AMERICAN C RIMINAL JUSTICE (2011).
29 See, e.g., Bazelon and Krinsky, There’s a Wave of New Prosecutors. And They Mean Justice.
30 Id.
22
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continue after release through expungement efforts.31 For example, in Brooklyn, New York,
District Attorney Eric Gonzalez advances the principle of routing low-level offenders out of the
criminal justice system.32

Likewise, the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office declines to

prosecute cases involving marijuana possession and smoking in public.33 Further, under the
direction of some prosecutors advocating criminal justice reform, New York state has moved to
clear records of marijuana convictions based on disproportionate effects on New Yorkers of
color.34 The efforts were led by both district attorneys and defense providers that are traditionally
adversaries.35 Manhattan District Attorney Cy Vance Jr. spoke to the new cooperative posture,
describing feeling of honor to work with defense attorneys in order to help ex-offenders by
removing unnecessary obstacles to necessary rights like employment, housing, and education.36
Reform to combat over-criminalization and its impact on people of color has swept the
country and created a visible contrast from the traditional tough on crime prosecutor persona to
the form of progressive prosecutor making promises.37 These promises can be summarized to
include less incarceration and more fairness and have increasingly become bi-partisan issues.38
This prosecutorial approach to justice has been dubbed more lenient than the prior traditional
adversarial posture.39 Prosecutors are rethinking whether and how to bring about charges and what
ensuring a fair process really means for the prosecutorial role.40 These progressive prosecutors

31

See, e.g., Azi Paybarah, About 160,000 People in New York to See Their Marijuana Convictions Disappear, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/28/nyregion/marijuana-records-new-york-city.html.
32 See, e.g., Bazelon and Krinsky, There’s a Wave of New Prosecutors. And They Mean Justice.
33 See, e.g., Paybarah, About 160,000 People in New York to See Their Marijuana Convictions Disappear.
34 Id.
35 Press Release, Manhattan DA, Through Groundbreaking Class Action, Hundreds of New Yorkers Have Old
Marijuana Convictions Sealed (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.manhattanda.org/through-groundbreaking-class-actionhundreds-of-new-yorkers-have-old-marijuana-convictions-sealed/.
36 Id.
37 See, e.g., Bazelon and Krinsky, There’s a Wave of New Prosecutors. And They Mean Justice.
38 Id.
39 See, e.g., Bellin, The Limits of Prosecutorial Power,
40 See, e.g., Bazelon and Krinsky, There’s a Wave of New Prosecutors. And They Mean Justice.
40 Id.
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have not only declined to charge certain low-level offenses, but also declined to ask for bail in
many misdemeanor cases.41
However, reform can be state by state and even office by office specific. Proponents for
community-based prosecution reform propose that reform to reimagine the prosecutorial role could
even be neighborhood by neighborhood based to reflect the fundamental democratic process.42
Neighborhood by neighborhood-based offices would be accountable and transparent to the
community they serve with a checks and balances system rooted in democracy.43
No matter the form, progressive prosecutors are popping up all over the country as agents
of change. It is worth mentioning that although prosecutors are displaying power to create positive
change on a case-by-case basis, without the support of other criminal justice actors, this reform
may not last.44 Prosecutors are not the only constitutional actors in the criminal justice system;
the legislature writes the laws and judges have the ultimate say over decisions such as bail.45 When
assessing the terrain of reform, it is important to realize that prosecutors operate within the
boundaries set by these other actors and therefore have restricted and not absolute power.46
Prosecutors still play an important part in criminal justice reform, but often on a case-by case
basis.47
Due to these limitations on the prosecutorial role and opponents against policy change
initiated by prosecutors, it is important to analyze the atypical phases where prosecutors have the
most power to step out of their traditional roles. Understanding the traditional prosecutorial role
in the light of the new era of prosecuting during charging, bail, and expungement will exemplify

41

Id.
Id.
43 See generally STUNTZ , THE C OLLAPSE OF AMERICAN C RIMINAL JUSTICE.
44 See, e.g., Bellin, The Limits of Prosecutorial Power,
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
42
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how prosecutors can effect positive change. Further, conceptualizing the theories of guidance for
effecting positive change at each of these phases can help show potential outcomes of what the
21st century prosecutor looks like and what the next century’s criminal justice system could look
like.
II.

AYTPICAL PHASES IN PROSECUTION AS BROAD POINTS OF FOCUS
This part narrows in on how prosecutors have become policy makers in addition to

traditional role of receiving evidence, bringing charges, bargaining, or going to trial in phases of
the criminal justice system that are not wholly adjudicative. These phases were traditionally all
adverse to the defense even though the purpose of such phases were not to determine the guilt or
innocence of the defendant. There has been a renewed examination of the prosecutorial role in
promoting cooperation in the atypical phases of pre-trial hearings, bail, and post-conviction
reentry, based on reform movements for decriminalization and prosecutorial enforcement. This
part will describe in turn the juxtaposition of the prosecutorial role during the atypical phases of
charging, bail, and expungement. The new movement has shined a light on these phases that were
typically not given much attention. The consequence of illuminating prosecutorial discretion in
these atypical phases is that the role of a prosecutor is in the legal and academic spotlight more
than ever. This part will show how progressive prosecutors are becoming both pseudo-adversarial
and quasi-legislative through displaying the potential influence prosecutors have in each phase and
in the criminal justice system, including reducing incarceration rates and disparate impact on
minorities.
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A. Deciding to Use the Full Power of Discretion
Many legal scholars argue that prosecutorial discretion in making decisions to charge is the
greatest extent of a prosecutor’s power. 48 This great power may be heightened by the vast number
of laws passed by the legislature, but the prosecutor’s politics may hold the most weight to place
an individual behind bars.49 Some legal scholars have even argued that the power of prosecutors
to decide who to charge is almost entirely unrestrained and the most important link in the chain of
the criminal system process.50 In the past, prosecutors who were tough on crime may have leaned
towards a modern tendency of overcharging.51 Especially during the 1980’s and 1990’s, some
prosecutors used their power of discretion to increase incarceration rates, but in the current
movement, prosecutorial power may cut the other way – decreasing incarceration.52
Jumping forward to the 21st century, incarceration rates are still high, but in cities like
Philadelphia who held the highest incarceration rate of the ten largest cities in America, diversity
and progressivism within the city’s residents combat tough on crime policies. 53 At this local level,
progressive prosecutors are winning elections.54 Even former President Barack Obama promoted
effecting change on the disparate impact of the criminal justice system through voting for
prosecutors who are viewing prosecution in a new light.55 Many legal scholars and criminal justice
actors have expressed concerns about the impact of selective prosecuting on race and

48

Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything Is a Crime, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 102, 103, (2013), http://www.columbialawreview.org/ham -sandwich-nation_Reynolds.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 104.
51 Id. at 105.
52 Can and Should Judges Demand Prosecutors Provide Written Explanations for Dismissals and Plea Deals?
Sentencing Law and Policy Blog (Aug. 17, 2020),
https://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2020/08/can-and-should-judges-demand-prosecutorsprovide-a-written-explanations-for-dismissals-and-plea-deal.html.
53 See, e.g., Gonnerman, Larry Krasner’s Campaign to End Mass Incarceration.
54 Id.
55 Id.
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overcriminalization,56 but this overwhelming prosecutorial power can be used for progressive
efforts as well.
Prosecutors are employing progressive efforts by making macro-legislative style decisions.
For District Attorney Larry Krasner in Philadelphia, District Attorney Rachel Rollins in Boston,
and other newly elected prosecutors, this means delivering change through decisions to stop
prosecuting certain crimes, including driving with a suspended license, drug possession and
shoplifting.57 Internal efforts such as these may deliver more of an impact on systemic issues in
the criminal justice system than other external efforts.58 Further, such internal efforts to use the
power of discretion to combat mass incarceration can operate like law.59 Local prosecutors can
announce general policies about charging that create a norm of declining to charge entire categories
of cases.60
Although the discretion wielded by prosecutors of the ‘80’s and ‘90’s was met with little
interference, now reformers who are flipping the coin of discretion are sometimes met with
pushback.61

For example, in Arlington County, Virginia, county judges are questioning

prosecutorial discretion wielded in this oppositive way.62 Progressive prosecutors in areas like
Arlington face opposition from not-so-progressive judges who have recently become enthusiastic
to review and regulate decisions to charge. 63 Some proponents of the reform movement rally for
a transparent review process as well, but typically seek explanations only for decisions to use

56

Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 I OWA L. REV. 125, 127-128 (2008).
See, e.g., Gonnerman, Larry Krasner’s Campaign to End Mass Incarceration.
58 Miller & Wright, supra note 56.
59 Id.
60 Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutors and their State and Local Polities, 110 J. C RIM. L. & C RIMINOLOGY 823 (2020),
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol110/iss4/6 .
61 Can and Should Judges Demand Prosecutors Provide Written Explanations for Dismissals and Plea Deals, supra
note 52.
62 Id.
63 Id.
57
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governmental power to charge and not forgoing such power in deciding not to charge. 64 On either
side of the debate, this leads to follow up questions about whether prosecutors were elected to
exercise this power and both whether and how prosecutors can reform the criminal justice system
if met with such resistance.
Resistance can also come from prosecutors who have fit the traditional mold throughout
their career.65 District Attorney’s like Larry Krasner in Philadelphia often turn to promotion of
progressive office culture and training, but sometimes the only option is restructuring.66 Beyond
buy-in from justice system actors, support must also come from funding partners in the community
to support any discretionary decisions that led to alternative paths of prosecution. Prosecutorial
discretion comes with the power to divert defendants from the criminal justice system to treatment,
rehabilitation, or community service programs, but financial resources may still hinder the
possibility of change.67
B. Bailing Out the Bail System
Financial resources are also at the crux of another restructuring effort – bail reform. The
traditional use of setting bail essentially equated itself to purchasing pre-trial release.68 The
purpose of bail was, and still is, to assure court appearance for those who were assumed not to be
a threat to public safety, but de facto detention occurred too often of those with the inability to
afford to post.69 Historically, bail was set high for most offences for the purpose of flight

64

Id.
See, e.g., Gonnerman, Larry Krasner’s Campaign to End Mass Incarceration.
66 Id.
67 See Generally, Beth McCann, Courtney Oliva & Ronald Wright, Prosecution Office Culture and Diversion
Programs, 21 WASH. CRIM. L. REP. 33 (2020),
https://e1e6cfc6-b1d4-4e45-b03c 22d8c290e050.filesusr.com/ugd/e009e5_b2b1f668d03449dbada3b1a0538b5a35.
68 Carol Trilling Linker & Stephen F. Sloan, NEW YORK SENATE R ESEARCH SERVICE TASK FORCE ON C RITICAL
PROBLEMS, Accused and Unconvinced: A Brief on Bail Practices at 4 (1978),
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/46590NCJRS.
69 Id.
65
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prevention, community safety and, some would argue, punishment.70 It is this later traditional
component that receives the most attack today. For decades, reformers have criticized the
traditional bail system for its inevitable disparate effect on indigent defendants in the face of
constitutional guarantees to not be excessive.71 These guarantees were only supported by a limited
range of options for pretrial conditions, with judges often choosing cash bail.72 Some studies show
that failure to post amounts for forty percent of jail populations.73 However, many bail statutes,
like the one in New York, proclaim that the bail system is not unconstitutional under either the
equal protection or the due processes clauses of both the United States Constitution and their
respective state constitutions.74 The bail system was traditionally, and in some states still is,
governed under the assumption that a right to bail was discretionary as long as it was not excessive,
but bail statutes in reforming states like New York, have written in a right to bail in the absence of
a sufficient reason for denial.75 The applicable New York statute has created bail as a matter of
right for misdemeanor cases and as a matter of discretion for greater offenses.

76

The Bail Reform Act has undergone various construction, but reform today essentially
exaggerates the ‘shall not be excessive’ boundary on setting bail. The basic framework is that
people should be released under the least restrictive conditions that still assure court appearance
and public safety.77 Even at the height of the tough on crime prosecutorial philosophy, the

70

Id.
Id. at 9.
72 See, e.g., Taryn A. Merkl, New York’s Latest Bail Law Changes Explained, B RENNAN C ENTER FOR JUSTICE , April
16, 2020, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/new-yorks-latest-bail-law-changes-explained.
73 Id.
74 N.Y. C ONST . ART I, § 5.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 See, e.g., Merkl, supra note 72.
71
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Supreme Court, advocated that detention should be a carefully considered exception to society’s
norm of liberty.78
But until progressive prosecutors have contributed to these least restrictive measures to
mean not letting one’s wallet be the difference in the likelihood of dentition, detention was not a
carefully considered exception. Current bail reform recognizes this systemic issue and includes
making more crimes eligible for cash bail, but more important to the movement, expanding pretrial
release conditions beyond cash.79

The movement seeks to attack the depredation of the

presumption of innocence of people jailed for failure to pay and the contribution to already
staggering and disproportionate prison populations. 80 Research shows that detainment can have
drastic consequences, including likelihood of fostering a plea deal even if innocent. 81 Prosecutors’
contributions of avoiding asking for bail and taking into account more factors, including a person’s
legal history and status, are considered high-impact policies against such dramatic results.82
Like the charging phase, local prosecutors are taking the wheel to be the policy impactors.83
Local prosecutors have discretion at the bail setting phase for any case.84 Progressive offices, like
the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, have erected office wide mandates to not seek bail for
an array of charges.85

78

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
See, e.g., Taryn A. Merkl, supra note 72.
80 Id.
81 See, e.g., Diana Dabruzzo, New Jersey Set Out to Reform Its Cash Bail System. Now, the Results Are In , ARNOLD
VENTURES, Nov. 14, 2019, https://www.arnoldventures.org/stories/new-jersey-set-out-to-reform-its-cash-bailsystem-now-the-results-are-in/.
82 See, e.g., Stephanie Wykstra , Bail Reform, Which Could Save Millions of Unconvicted People From Jail, Explained,
VOX, Oct. 27, 2028, https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/17/17955306/bail-reform-criminal-justiceinequality.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
79
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However, some criminal justice actors find bail reform at odds with the traditional role of
the prosecutor to promote public safety. A study done in Cook County, Illinois 86 and the New
York Police Department 87 argue that such reform increases crime. Further, court systems worry
lack of funding will stop reform before it can even get on its feet. 88 Some judges, like a few in
Bronx County, New York, even work around reform by setting a bail amount too high for indigent
defendants to pay, appearing to have the goal of defeating the intent of the new legislature and
returning to the old ways.89 In fact, it is ultimately the judge who sets bail with the discretion to
override a prosecutor’s recommendation.90
Despite the opposition, reformers push for change in this pretrial phase due to the vast
negative penalties that detention can have on a person.91 Even detainment for a short period of
time pretrial can dramatically impact a person’s ability to retain their job, housing, children, and
driver’s license.92
C. Forgiving and Forgetting Past Crimes for Future Rights
If pretrial detention can have such a damaging and lasting impact on a person’s rights,
being incarcerated because of conviction or taking a plea, can destroy someone’s future. Having
a criminal record generates collateral consequences that will continue to regulate the lives of exoffenders long after they have left prison.93

Being in the system traditionally meant being

86

See, e.g., Merkl, supra note 72.
See, e.g., Tina Moore & Jorge Fitz-Gibbon, Bail Reform a Significant Reason for Crime Spike, NYPD says, N.Y.
POST, March 5, 2020, https://nypost.com/2020/03/05/bail-reform-a-significant-reason-for-crime-spike-nypd-says/.
88 See generally, Glenn A. Grant, J.A.D., Acting Administrative Director of the Courts, New Jersey Courts, Report to
the Governor and the Legislature (2018).
89 See, e.g., Akash Mehta , A Broken Bond: How New York Judges Are Getting Around Bail Reform, THE C ITY, Oct.
12, 2020, https://www.thecity.nyc/2020/10/12/21512018/new-york-judges-getting-around-bail-reform-bond.
90 See, e.g., Bellin, The Limits of Prosecutorial Power,
91 See, e.g., Dabruzzo, New Jersey Set Out to Reform Its Cash Bail System. Now, the Results Are In .
92 Id.
93 See, e.g., Reuben Jonathan Miller, How Thousands of American Laws Keep People ‘Imprisoned’ Long After They’re
Released, POLITICO, Dec. 30, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/12/30/post-prison-laws-reentry451445.
87

Thomas

17

imprisoned after release by means of restrictions in where a person could work and live, and even
how they could receive an education or participate in democracy.94 Reformers have dubbed exoffenders as stuck in a state of quasi-citizenship materialized by legislative agendas.95 After being
held on the inside, ex-offenders enter the outside world to face a similar alienation, and with
disparate proportions in prison populations, people of color inevitably face disparate impact when
re-entering society as well.96 However, expungement rests on the policy of allowing an exoffender to move on from such identity and create a new future without grave restrictions on their
rights.97
There are similarities in the motivations behind the law of expungement and the goals of
reformers, such that both have roots in sympathetic policymakers,98 but expungement as a remedy
was welcomed on a smaller and more boundary-filled scale than reformers hope for today. In
addition, expungement and sealing efforts were traditionally paid little attention in terms of actual
results99 unlike the goal of reformers who now wish to evaluate its benefits. States have always
had varied available expungement remedies and continue to have different expungement and
sealing laws with remaining procedural hurdles.100

In the legal world, expungement is

characterized as a forgetting form of relief and sealing a record is characterized a forgiving form
of relief.101 Jurisdictions make separate choices about which route to utilize. Traditionally,

94

Id.
Id.
96 See generally, ALEXANDER, supra ntoe 5.
97 State v. N.W., 747 A.2d 819, 832 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (discussing the purpose of expungement is to
create a second chance for an ex-offender).
98 See Bernard Kogon & Donald L. Loughery Jr., Sealing and Expungement of Criminal Records — The Big Lie, 61
J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 378, 378 (1970).
99 Id.
100 See generally, Brain M. Murray, Unstitching Scarlet Letters?: Prosecutorial Discretion and Expungement, 86
FORDHAM L. R. J. 6, 2821-2871, 2842 (2018) (detailing the historical and current layout of expungement laws).
101 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §4852.01 (West 2018).
95

Thomas

18

petitioners for expunging or sealing their records needed to overcome a presumption of retaining
criminal records available for public record and often boundless paperwork.102
Reformers are pushing back against the hurdles before ex-offenders, both upon reentry and
in efforts to petition for expungement.

The movement, and even the so-called progressive

prosecutor, encourages measures to expand the number and type of convictions eligible for
expungement,103 reduce waiting time to be able to petition for expungement,104 and lowering the
number of procedural requirements that need to be met to satisfy the burden for petitioning. 105 Socalled clean slate states have even considered automatic expungement or sealing of certain types
of lessor offenses.106 Michigan was recently the sixth state to offer this automatic relief and also
expanded petition-based relief for most misdemeanors and some felonies. 107 But even clean slate
states, the remaining procedural hurdles continue to grant prosecutors mechanisms by which to
either stall or hasten the process.108
Prosecutors are often the first point of review of a petition for expungement, and in some
states, are the final point of objection.109 In most states, although judges are typically the final
authority, prosecutors are themselves judges on the merits of a petition.110 Further, state statutes
like New York’s § 216 leave room for prosecutors to act in this quasi-judicial way, including that
a good cause showing can be considered under the interests of the public and the parties, which
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impliedly includes the State.111 The movement today is against using these considerations and
procedural hurdles to stall the process. Instead, progressive prosecutors go further than simply not
objecting to petitions for expungement but promote affirmative actions to help hasten the process
for certain categories of crime. These affirmative actions can take the form of meeting with
employers to encourage hiring of people with past criminal records, like District Attorney Ben
David in Wilmington, North Carolina. DA David explained these active steps as a method to stop
prosecuting ex-offenders to help with reentry.112
III.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR THE NEW PROSECUTORIAL ROLE
Part I established the rise of a new era of prosecution. Part II explained how prosecutors

are in positions that may demand more scrutiny in their role. With these concepts discussed in the
above parts, now it is important to explore the ways to conceive of a prosecutor’s role in atypical
phases. This part is an exploration of the theories of prosecution among legal scholars and the
potential guiding legal and ethical principles for prosecutors in the face of progressive reform in
phases that were mainly governed by tradition.
A. Theories of Prosecution: Justice Doers or Legal Servants
There is no generally accepted theory of the prosecutorial role,113 but some legal scholars
conceive prosecutors as agents of the populace. Naturally, the lack of normative theory for the
prosecutorial role has implications in how prosecutors may act during charging, bail, and
expungement decisions. Two leading theories include the “do justice” model and the “servant of
the law” theory of prosecutorial behavior. 114 Yet, there is disconcertion among constitutional
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actors about what each of these theories mean. 115 Judges may use the “do justice” slogan to
criticize prosecutorial failure, while legislatures may point to the idea as prosecutorial duty, and
prosecutors themselves may practice the concept as a rationale for power wielding.116
The “do justice” model is malleable to how prosecutors wish to wield their power
irrespective of whether their goal is to be traditionally tough on crime or progressively reform. In
the traditional sense, prosecutors can claim they are doing justice by being more severe in the
phases of charging, bail, and expungement.

On the other hand, prosecutors like those in

Philadelphia seek justice for society by being more lenient in those phases.117 Prosecutors on either
side of the reform movement embrace the “do justice” model, but the lack of uniformity in
conceptualizing the prosecutorial role undermines any uniformity in what justice means for this
model.118 Conceptualizing prosecutors as justice doers only undermines any clear guidance for
the prosecutorial role and generates further ambiguity on how prosecutors should act in any
phase.119

Even when the “do justice” model is embraced, it does not legally govern the

prosecutorial role. Prosecutors are only legally bound to comply with applicable rules of procedure
and case precedent.120
Legal scholar Jeffery Bellin argues that shifting from this “do justice” model to the “servant
of the law” paradigm would keep justice related concerns at the forefront but with a more
consistency to promote clear guidance.121 Prosecutors would no longer mechanically enforce
criminal statutes but weigh constitutional significances such as due process and procedural
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protections like discovery requirements.122 Bellin argues this shift would lesson tension between
the prosecutorial role and the progressive prosecutor movement.123 His argument focuses on how
an orientation from this paradigm should highlight the underlying mission of the criminal justice
system rather than appearing to override the actions of other constitutional actors.124 Progressive
prosecutors could subvert backlash as zealous servants to the law and current existing legal rules,
finding a particular shield in defendant-protective rules that support cooperation.125 By following
the lead of the applicable background law, prosecutors can be less adversarial and more lenient
when the law allows in the phases of charging, bail and expungement.126 When the law provides
for prosecutorial choices without guidance, the default would be leniency, but when deviation
from the default is necessary, there is likely to be transparency and consistency. 127
However, the “servant of the law” theory narrows the role of a prosecutor, may still receive
opposition as a different means to the same end, and has limited legal guidance to draw from.128
There are still issues with potential criticism no matter being grounded in such limited background
law and opposers can still argue that certain laws may run counter to such progressive reform. At
the heart of this debate is the narrowing of the prosecutorial function such that other actors in the
criminal justice system hold similar responsibility to ensure justice.129 Arguably, a narrowing of
the scope of a prosecutor’s role may take some of their power away necessary to effect positive
change in a way counter to the objective of the reform movement. Further, with limited legal
guidance, deviation from default would likely be the norm and not the exception.
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B. Limited Legal Principles and the Separation of Powers Limitation
There is little governing law for a prosecutor’s role particularly in the phases of charging,
bail, and expungement. Opposers to the reform movement expect prosecutors to always have their
role fully grounded in the enforcement and not in the creation of the law. But the new era
prosecutors rest their decisions to decarcerate on legal policy grounds about their role in enforcing
justice.130 At the center of the legal argument against reform stands the separation of powers
doctrine. Critics against prosecutorial discretion used in this way say prosecutors are responsible
for upholding the law, but progressive prosecution is undermining it.131 For instance, in opposition
to prosecutors’ decisions not to charge, critics argue for a prosecutor’s traditional role and against
crossing the line between executive and legislative powers. 132 Further, in making blanket decisions
against charging, for other bail conditions, or for expungement, prosecutors are exercising a refusal
of enforcement that effectively rewrites law.133
Some cases, like Ayala v. Scott, show how perceived prosecutorial overstepping into
another constitutional actor’s realm have reached state court.134 Aramis Ayala, an elected Florida
prosecutor met criticism for her decisions to not pursue the death penalty for any charge.135 In
Florida, Governor Rick Scott attempted to take back his power by using his constitutional authority
to reassign criminal cases from Ayala’s office under the legal requirement of good reason – that
reason was rooted in the separation of powers. 136 Governor Scott claimed that separation of powers
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meant that he had a good reason to reassign cases from Ayala’s office is Ayala was exercising
legislative rather than executive power. 137
Some Supreme Court rulings have touched on prosecutorial law and has made some
pronouncements of how they conceive a prosecutor’s role as a matter of law. The Supreme Court
holds prosecutors as representatives of the sovereign with an obligation to govern impartially and
an interest in justice above winning at all costs. 138 Further, the Court found prosecutors “may
strike hard blows, [but are] not at liberty to strike foul ones. 139 The problem is that different
constitutional actors of different jurisdictions have different ideas of what foul blows means.
However, there are some cases that can lead to inferences that prosecutors must not always be
adversarial. For example, prosecutors must not suppress evidence favorable to a defendant, and
instead must turn such evidence over to presumedly help the defense. 140
C. Model Rules Against Mass Incarceration
Beyond legal principles, ethical guidance begs to outweigh any quasi-legislative concerns
of a prosecutor’s action with systemic issues in the criminal justice system. However, the Model
Rules and their adaptions by the states are lacking as a balancing mechanism of what a prosecutor
should do. In the face of this reform, there is a concern of whether Model Rule 3.8 needs to be
updated. Currently, Model Rule 3.8 only uniformly provides guidance on the phase of charging
such that prosecutors shall refrain from charging without being supporting by probable cause.141
This leaves a vast amount of room for discretion in charging. Further, without any mention of bail
or expungement in Model Rule 3.8, prosecutors have almost complete ethical discretion on their
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role in those phases. Thus, an update to the model rules about the prosecutorial role in nonadjudicative phases could alleviate concerns about limited uniform guidance in local prosecutor
reform.

Some legal scholars argue for consistency of process in guiding prosecutor’s case

management decisions at the charging, bail, and expungement phases to achieve reformist goals
against racial injustice and mass incarceration.142
On the other hand, the lack of binding principles leaves room for creativity, but there is
still little ethical clarity on how a prosecutor can use their roles in non-adjudicative phases. Office
culture with policy driven motives is used to challenge the lack of legal guidance with a movement
from within. But these movements within local prosecutor offices lack uniformity as well. Still,
there are arguments of whether diversity and creativity should triumph over uniformity and overall
clarity because what makes sense in one jurisdiction may not make sense in another. Further,
some legal scholars argue that reform should be based on a democratic process of community or
neighborhood input.143

For example, in exploring declinations to charge through use of

prosecutorial discretion, legal scholars have argued that loyalties to local votes should influence
such office-wide mandates.144 This duty to local polities can be supported under justifications of
limited resources as well.145
In every jurisdiction and for each atypical phase, moral principles have justified
progressive reform against systemic issues both underlying and created by mass incarceration.
First, there are concerns of whether prison has the desired effect on an individual or a negative
cyclical effect.146 Second, even if prison may have desired effects on some, every offender may
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not deserve or rehabilitate from the full extent of the criminal justice process. 147 Third, beyond
arguments of desert, prison will almost certainly have a negative impact on ex-inmates. Being
incarcerated not only cuts prisoners off from their loved ones and their place in society, upon
release ex-offenders have a hard reentering society, with limited rights in terms of jobs, housing,
education, and voting.148
IV.

PRESCRIPTION FOR PROSECUTOR ACTION IN ATYPICAL PHASES
After an exploration of the potential guiding legal and ethical principles for prosecutors

choosing progressive reform in phases that were mainly governed by tradition, it is necessary to
canvas the application of these different theories behind conceiving a prosecutor’s role today.
There was traditionally a way a prosecutor should act, but now there is a menu of options for how
a prosecutor can act in the atypical phases of charging, bail, and expungement. This part is not
necessarily creating a solution to the problem faced by the movement, but instead presents all
facets of the problem. Prosecutors as democratic representatives may mean different things in
different jurisdictions and for different phases. Therefore, this part will create a map of the effects
of various theories and the lack of formal legal or ethical guidance on the different atypical phases.
A. Wielding Discretion under Discretionary Theories
Prosecutors hold some of the greatest power in the criminal justice system through
discretion in making decisions to charge.149 This great power may be almost unrestrained,150 and
one of the key phases prosecutors can use to either be traditionally tough on crime by
overcharging,151 or progressively combat over criminalization through decreasing incarceration.152
147
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Progressive prosecutors argue overcriminalization continues to be a major problem in the United
States which has retrospective concerns about selective prosecuting on mass incarceration and
disparate impact on race,153 but prosecutors can also use this power to combat these criminal justice
issues.
The “do justice” model offers a means for prosecutors to wield their power with the goal
of progressive form. Prosecutors can support their blanket decisions not to charge on the grounds
of doing justice for society. However, there are few legal factors binding prosecutors, and only
one ethical suggestion in Model Rule 3.8, which only requires prosecutors to refrain from charging
without being supporting by probable cause.154 This leaves room for backlash by way of separation
of powers augments. In opposition to prosecutors’ decisions not to charge, critics argue the line
between executive and legislative powers is crossed.155
The “servant of the law” theory is equally as unclear in terms of guidance. Prosecutors can
use this theory to support decisions not to charge, or to charge more leniently, 156 by weighing the
constitutional significances as due process and defendant-protective procedural protections.157
Scholars suggest that when there is no background law on how to act, prosecutors should act with
leniency as a default,158 but in decisions to charge, the background legal guidance is sparse. Like
the “do justice” model, the ambiguity in the “servant of the law” theory leaves open room for
separation of powers critiques. Prosecutors only have limited case precedent to combat such
opposers. 159
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Prosecutors like those in Philadelphia160 and Boston161 seem to apply the justice doers of
society concept through stopping the prosecution of crimes that tend to do more harm when
punishing the individual than to society when committed. These crimes include driving with a
suspended license, drug possession and shoplifting. 162 Such prosecutors employ a progressive “do
justice” model to impact systemic issues in the criminal justice system by way of internal efforts
and office culture. 163 But these internal efforts can operate like law,164 because local prosecutors
can mandate office-wide policies.165
Prosecutors acting in this quasi-legislative way face an uphill battle against not-soprogressive judges who have recently become enthusiastic to review and regulate decisions to
charge. 166 Legislatures may also move for such discretion to have a transparent review process.167
Beyond outside constitutional actors, resistance can also come from within.168 In Philadelphia,
being a progressive justice doer office looks like an office restructuring.169 Progressive reformists
who remain after restructuring may fight against opposition with community support and the idea
that doing justice does not necessarily mean being severe in charging or bringing charges at all. It
is possible that data on community impact from leniency in charging may provide further support.
For now, neither side of the argument seems to have an outright winning argument in terms of
legal and ethical theory.
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B. Out Theories on Bail Reform
Traditionally, bail was another phase where prosecutors could wield power to increase
detention since posting bail was essentially the same as purchasing pre-trial release.170 The
purpose of bail was always to assure court appearances and public safety, but this indirectly meant
detention simply due to inability to pay.171 Historically, bail was sometimes set high as a means
of punishment, but no matter the rationale, only led to the detention to indigent defendants. 172
Further, although constitutional guarantees against excessiveness exist, 173 traditionally the bail
system meant disparate effects on these indigent defendants with only a limited range pretrial
condition options.174
Under a “servant of the law theory,” prosecutors can rely on such constitutional guarantees
in making decisions surrounding bail. Unlike the phase of charging, each state has the background
law of a bail statute. However, many bail statutes, including New York’s, find the system not
unconstitutional under either the equal protection or the due processes clauses of both the United
States Constitution and their respective state constitutions. 175 The right to bail is governed by a
discretionary standard when not excessive, but progressive bail reformists like those in New York,
have written in a right to bail when lacking sufficient reason for denial.176 The New York statute
created the right to bail for misdemeanor cases and promotes discretion for greater offenses. 177
Progressive reformists who consider themselves either justice doers or servants of the law,
exaggerate the anti-excessive boundary to rework bail. Arguably, prosecutors promoting bail
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reform could consider themselves doing justice for society or being supported under a “servant of
the law” theory in the anti-excessive legal background to push for defendants to be released under
the least restrictive conditions that assure court appearance and public safety.178
In making these blanket decisions for least restrictive bail conditions, prosecutors are
exercising a refusal of enforcement that effectively rewrites law. 179 Like making blanket decisions
for charging, progressive prosecutors are essentially policy impactors, 180 and progressive offices
like Philadelphia’s and New York’s, are using office wide mandates to not seek bail for lowerlevel offenses.181 Although there is potential for similar separation of powers arguments to that of
office wide mandates in decisions to charge, bail reformists face backlash that they are not
necessarily doing justice. The New York Police Department argues that such reform increases
crime.

182

Even if later studies undermine this opposing argument, prosecutors who are basing

their bail reform power in the legal guidance provided in bail statutes can still be undermined by
other constitutional actors. Some judges, like a few in the Bronx, New York use their power as
the ultimate decisionmaker in bail setting183 to override the prosecutor’s discretion and combat
bail reform by reverting to high monetary amounts.184 For now, the success of bail reform may
depend more on how judges wield their power than how prosecutors are conceived.
C. Theories to Forgive and Forget
Having a criminal record regulates the lives of ex-offenders long after they have left
prison.185 Traditionally, being imprisoned for any portion of time meant facing imprisonment
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upon reentry due to restrictions of rights relevant to housing, work, and education.186 Ex-offenders
face further alienation, and with disparate proportions inside prison , people of color inevitably
face disparate impact on the outside well.187 Expungement’s goal is to allow ex-offenders to move
past prison and have a new future.188
Expungement reformists have the benefit under a “do justice” model that motivations
behind the idea of expungement and the recent progressive goals have roots in sympathetic
policymakers.189 States are varied in expungement remedies, procedural hurdles, and restrictions
governing reentry.190 Under either a “do justice” model of not continuing to imprison those who
have been released or a “servant of the law” theory rooted in the law of expungement itself,
reformers desire to reduce such procedural hurdles and restrictions upon reentry. Their efforts
include expanding the number and type of convictions eligible for expungement, 191 reducing
waiting time to be able to petition for expungement,192 and lowering the number of procedural
requirements that need to be met to satisfy the burden for petitioning. 193 Some states go as far as
a clean slate through automatic expungement of lessor offenses.194 States also vary on whether
prosecutors are the first or final point of review of a petition for expungement.195 In states where
prosecutors are judges on the merits of a petition, they bypass judicial authority to override them
unlike in the bail context.196
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New York is an example where prosecutors have support to act in this quasi-judicial way
under a “servant of the law” theory due to the law on expungement. Specifically, prosecutors can
produce a good cause showing under the interests of the public and the parties. 197 Arguably, this
good cause showing itself may resemble the “do justice” model on behalf of society.

To

progressive prosecutors, doing justice at the expungement phase means more than simply not
objecting to petitions, but taking affirmative actions as agents of change. Such actions include
meeting with employers to encourage hiring of people with past criminal records. 198 Prosecutors
who are acting as agents of change reference support beyond the limited legal guidance and
theories that conceive their role, but in the ethical considerations of fostering a better criminal
justice system.
CONCLUSION
Twenty-first century prosecutors are forced to make blanket decisions in phases of the
criminal justice system where guilt is not the factual issue before the court. Although bargaining
may be present, the phases of charging, bail, and expungement do not focus on adjudication.
Traditionally, a prosecutor’s role was to be tough on crime and adversarial.199 Today, that tradition
may not make sense.

The progressive prosecuting reform movement pushes for a more

cooperative approach in the atypical phases of the criminal justice system. 200 Some offices
promote this culture in office-wide mandates to deny charging of certain crimes, promote bail
reform, and represent class actions of expungement. Offices like these have brought about a rise
in prosecutors as primary actors for positive change in the face of systemic issues in the criminal
justice system.
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Prosecutors are prime players in determining who to charge, who to release, and who has
their record expunged. Such phases have become broad points of focus in decriminalization. Our
nation traditionally continued to increase incarceration rates even as the leader in percentage of
imprisoned people in the world,201 which directly continued to increase the disparate ratio of
minorities in the system.202 This new prosecutorial approach can bring prosecutors to the forefront
of combating the issues of mass incarceration and criminalization. However, this new approach
is arguably quasi-legislative and has been viewed as undermining priorities of other constitutional
actors.
There is little governing law for the prosecutorial role in the atypical phases of charging,
bail and expungement, but constitutional actors who oppose the movement have made separation
of powers arguments against sweeping progressive reform. Thus, beyond whether prosecutors
should use their power to generate criminal justice reform, this paper asks the question of what
legal and ethical principles should provide guidance. Academics argue over guidance based on
Supreme Court precedent, the separation of powers doctrine, the Model Rules, line prosecution
norms and internal office culture. Arguments extend to the concepts of uniformity versus diversity
and whether communities should have more say over the actions of their elected prosecutors.
Comparing the traditional prosecutorial role against progressive prosecution in the phases
of charging, bail, and expungement, makes clear that prosecutors have power to effect change in
a criminal justice system faced with mass incarceration and disparate impact. What is unclear is
what legal and ethical principles should govern prosecutors as they wield this power. Theories of
prosecution may work differently for different phases and in different locations. Ultimately, it will
likely continue fall to the individual offices to determine their own conception of the prosecutor’s
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role during the atypical phases of charging, bail, and expungement and the impact different
conceptions at these phases may have on criminal justice reform.
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